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The place of agricultural research in the development ofsub-Saharan Africa
Michael Lipton
Research: Resources, Policy, Results
This article is confined to the countries in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), excluding the Republic of South Africa
(RSA). It largely excludes the policy requirements of
agricultural research and the statistical evidence
[Lipton 1985].
Three general statements can be made. Despite the
path-breaking experiences in Asia of (say) the
Punjabs, Sonora, and Central Luzon - and despite
the African precedent, now 20 years old, of SR-52
hybrid maize - most of SSA now offers smaliholders
no dramatic, immediately applicable new technology
that might, with plausible increases in output/input
price ratios, or in person/land ratios, safely and
substantially increase the profitability of food farming
over large areas. While this is so, the elasticity of total
farm output to currently recommended policy
changes, including price changes, can seldom be very
large. More or better agricultural research (AR) is
necessary, but seldom sufficient, to remedy this.
The AR policy issue can be addressed by seeking o
explain a paradox. Rates of return to AR have been
shown to be very large. By the standards of the
developing world, SSA appears to be spending a good
deal on AR (and to be supporting it with unusually
high levels of extension).' Yet, by those same
standards, agricultural growth in SSA, except for a
few countries, has been notoriously slow. Moreover,
SSA is unlike other parts of the world in that the
success of a nation's agriculture does not seem to have
been strongly linked to its level or growth-rate of AR
outlay or scientist numbers.
There are two explanations. First, there is less AR in
most of SSA than there seems to be. Second, even that
'less' is less good at producing output-oriented results
For es dence that outlay on extension generally increases the return
to outlay - especially subsequent outlay - on research, see
Evenson and Kisles, 1976. On SSA's exceptionally high extension-
research ratios, see Oram and Bindlish, 1981: 44, lOO; Boyce and
Evenson, 1975: 3-13 and especially Pinstrup-Andersen, 1982: 66-7.
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in SSA than in most other poor countries. Many,
probably most, SSA countries are paying for - and
getting - much less AR than the crude numbers
(dollars, scientific person-years) indicate.
An even more important explanation of the paradox
lies in the nature of that research. One group of
problems concerns critical mass. There seem to be
scale-economies in research-station size, to well above
the sizes achieved in most of SSA.2 Yet the difficulties
of SSA countries, mostly poor and small, in attaining
critical mass are aggravated by high turnover; by 'loss'
of AR benefits to nearby countries without regional
co-ordination; and by dispersion of scientists among
stations and programmes.
This last problem arises partly out of efforts to solve a
second group of problems, those of relevance of
centralised AR to local conditions. Partly, this is due
to lack of 'congruence' [Boyce and Evenson, 1975:83-
98; Judd, Boyce and Evenson, 1983:23-8] between the
output-mix and the research-mix, even allowing for
different prospects of success in different types of
work. Partly, it reflects inadequate integration of
economic and social analysis into agricultural
research. The overseas orientation of much SSA
research cannot help either.
But the main reason why SSA agricultural research
has not contributed more to output is the absence of a
proper policy framework. This gap explains the truly
appalling shortage of basic facts on farm output,
especially smaliholder food output - and even, to
some extent, about farm research. Is 'research policy',
then, the key? In one sense, no: little will be achieved
by persuading SSA countries to adopt a blueprint that
centralises agricultural research upon a high-powered
research institute or interdepartmental committee. In
a second sense, again no: overall policy (on food
strategies, nutrition and tncome-distribution, infor-
2 There appear, however, tobe diseconomies of scale to expansion of
a country's total researcher establishment: see Boyce and Evenson,
1975: 99-lOO.
A simple grain mill enhances productivity.
mation systems, labour-intensity, irrigation and water
management, and above all agriculture's share of real
resources) is required, before research policy can help.
Yet, in a final sense, research policy is the key. It is
possible to outline research contents, career structures,
and priorities that - given adequate real indigenous
resources and a roughly feasible agricultural policy
will greatly increase the chances that those resources
will achieve the output and distribution goals of the
policy.
High AR Spending, Low Output Pay-off
The size of AR in SSA, compared to agricultural
output and even agricultural production, seems to be
quite large. In 1974, public-sector agricultural
research expenditure was 1.12 per cent of agricultural
output in western SSA, 1.63 per cent in eastern SSA,
and about 1.45 per cent in southern SSA.3 Figures for
other developing regions were substantially lower, e.g.
0.31 per cent in South Asia and 0.49 per cent in SE
Ibid., p.46. The last figure includes RSA, but its ratio appears to be
closer to I percent than to 1.5 per cent. Hence the ratio for southern
SSA proper is even higher than 1.45 per cent.
Asia.4 Comparisons for 1980 are available for only a
few LDCs. They show a similarly high-spending
performance on SSA research, at each income level.
In 1975, 10 examples of direct cost-benefit analysis,
and 11 sources-of-growth studies of national AR were
collated. Internal rates of return in the former group
ranged from 20 per cent (US poultry) to 60 per cent
(Indian sugarcane) and 45-93 per cent (Mexico,
various crops). The seven studies from developing
countries showed somewhat higher returns than the
studies from developed countries, and a parallel study
'estimated marginal internal rates of return of 42 per
cent to technologically oriented research in developing
countries and 21 per cent in developed countries'
[Boyce and Evenson 1975:110, fn.]. However, there
was not one study of returns in SSA [ibid.: 103].
By 1982, 50 such studies - still not one in SSA -
could be collated. 'Average annual rates of return for
4ßoyce and Evenson 1975: 46. Other (generally richer) developing
regions: West Asia, 0.83 per cent; North Africa, 0.72 per cent;
temperate South America, 1.29 per cent; tropical South America,
1.03 per cent; Central America and Caribbean, 0.71 per cent.
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these programmes are slightly less than 50 per cent,
only four showing returns of less than 20 per cent.'
Eight studies in Asian developing countries showed
average returns of 44 per cent, and the 14 quantifiable
returns in Latin America averaged 47 per cent
[Pinstrup-Andersen 1982:102-4].
Whatever allowances need to be made for bad data,
however, we have a paradox. Returns to AR are
extremely high, especially in LDCs. Public5 research
outlay per unit of GDP, of land area, and of
agricultural6 population was much higher in the 1970s
in SSA than in South or South-East Asia. Yet
agricultural production grew far more slowly for most
of SSA than for most of South, and almost all of SE,
Asia [World Bank 1984:90,2201. There is no
correlation between substantial (or fast-growing) AR
and good agricultural performance in SSA, as there is,
for example, among India's Districts [Evenson and
Kislev; and Oram and Bindlish 1981, Annex 2B1.
Moreover, rapid growth of national public-sector AR
outlays in SSA - more than tripling as a share of
agricultural GDP in West Africa, and more than
quintupling in East Africa, in 1959-80 - accompanied
sharp deceleration in agricultural growth [Judd el al.,
19831.
Of course, even good AR is not sufficient for growth.
This is constrained in SSA by the physical, climatic,
trade and policy environments - bad, worsening, and
unpredictably fluctuating. The dichotomy 'research-
environment' cannot be pushed too hard, as good
research aims at suitability for the environment. It is,
in any case, fairly clear that national agricultural
research in much of SSA is not giving value for money.
Large outlays are buying modest numbers of
scientists, often underqualified, who are producing
extremely modest results by world standards.
AR Output/Cost Relationships
Compared to the low-income South Asian countries
(India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal)
the six low-income SSA countries with available data
for 1980 spent 1.8 times as large a share of (alleged)
agricultural GDP on national agricultural research.
However, in 1980 they paid 3.2 times as much per
scientist-year. Nevertheles, in 1974, SSA obtained
only 55 per cent as many 'standardised publications'
per scientist-year [Boyce and Evenson 1975:42]. Thus,
5The private sector contributes only 3 per cent of agricultural
research outlays in developing Asia and Africa [Boyce and Evenson
1975: 77].
6For example, in the eight 'SSA low-income countries' in Table I
[Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal (sic). Sudan, Tanzania,
Togo and Zaire: Oram and Bindlish 1981: 89], the proportion of
their total population dependent mainly on agriculture is above 80
per cent, as against some 65-68 per cent for the low-income
SSA region.
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despite a much larger research effort relative to GDP,
the low-income SSA countries with recent figures
appear to have obtained barely 30 per cent as much
national 'research output', as indicated by standardised
publications, per unit of agricultural GDP as did the
South Asian countries.7 Several specialists, at a recent
IFPRI meeting, concurred that the cost of doing a
comparable piece of research was at least three times
as high in SSA as in South Asia; for low-income
countries '30 per cent as much research output per unit
of agricultural GDP, despite 1.8 times more outlay per
unit' suggests an even worse relative performance.
So part of the explanation of the SSA agricultural
paradox - high national AR outlay, slow agricultural
growth, yet world-scale evidence of good agricultural
returns to research - is that most of SSA is getting
exceptionally little 'real' national research output per
scientist, and paying heavily for each scientist: and this
despite unusually high support from extension, and
from international research systems. Since 'countries
will respond to lower prices of national scientific
resources. . . the issue of training scientists at low cost
in national programs now deserves much greater
attention from aid donors' [Judd el al., 1983:47].
Further, so-called 'national AR' in much of SSA -
despite exceptions, such as Kenya - reflects foreign
money, personnel, and intellectual commitment much
more than in other developing regions.
Critical Mass and Local Relevance
Part of the reason why many African governments
as opposed to aid donors - find AR unattractive is
the group of problems associated with critical mass.
World-wide, countries with below $400 of GDP per
person in 1974 located 49 per cent of their scientists in
experiment stations with over 21 persons; the
proportion for better-off countries was 61 per cent
[Boyce and Evenson 1975:83]. Poor communications
within LDCs make the dispersion of scientists in SSA
even more damaging to prospects of achieving a
critical mass; so does the fact that, because fewer
scientists are highly trained (and because technicians
and administrators are scarce), much 'research' time
in each station is diverted to technical and
administrative duties.
Compared with South Asia, too, the small populations
of most SSA countries - together with the fact that a
typical such country combines agricultural diversity
with linguistic specificity - aggravate the problem
even further, Each small country's government must
fear, rightly, that its own spending on research will
produce mostly unrequited benefits for foreigners.
Regional research cooperation has its own costs, both
7Standardised publications are explained, and data gtven, in Boyce
and Evenson 1975: 39-42 and 84-96.
if nations fall out (as in East Africa) and if free-riding
has to be policed. The need to incorporate several
disciplines, socioeconomic as well as scientific, ifAR is
to produce results that benefit smallholders also
carries a double burden: it directly raises the required
critical mass, and it does so indirectly by imposing,
upon researchers, costs of communication to
non-specialists.
In these extremely difficult circumstances, there are
two possible ways to ease the problem: to reduce staff
turnover, or, to reduce the number of research
stations. Clearly the second approach has drawbacks,
so one would expect great concentration on the first.
One would be disppointed. Kenya is a particularly
telling case, because both its AR and its medium-term
agricultural growth have been well above the SSA
norm [Taylor el al., 198l:v]. Yet 'a USAID report of
September 1977 documented the loss of more than 58
research scientists [Out of thosel working three years
earlier' [ibid. :77], i.e. about one in four [Boyce and
Evenson 1975:174; Judd et al. 1983:60, Oram and
Bindlish 1981:891. This is not due mainly to high
expatriate turnover - 'average length of employment
in the research division of the Ministry of Agriculture
has been 21/2 years for Kenyan personnel and 31/2 years
for expatriates' [Taylor el al. 1981:80]. Not all
turnover is loss, Some is due to higher training, or
transfers to research in the private sector, to (doubtless
progressive) farming, or to academic research or
management. One does, however, have the uncom-
fortable suspicion that most turnover is into jobs,
often abroad, that do little for AR in SSA. Certainly,
much occurs because:
AR scientists and their role in national agricultural
development lack recognition [;] the research cadre
[is paid less] than people with comparable training
and experience in other components of the
agricultural sector; [and] the present scheme of
service does not provide for scientific career
development, recognition and reward for research
productivity [Taylor el al., 1981:80-81].
If these career-based causes of high turnover apply
even in Kenya, they apply much more forcibly in most
of SSA, and are indeed richly documented in various
ISNAR reports. Anyway, even where the causes of
turnover from public AR are benign and where the
recipient sectors benefit greatly, the problem of lost
critical mass remains.
Moreover, high turnover among, and out of, public-
sector AR stations is damagingly synergistic with the
often large number of such stations. Ifwe remain with
Kenya, 'research on priority [food] crops is
undertaken principally in 42 national and regional
sub-stations'; there are also separate commodity
research stations for sugar, coffee (four), tea and
cotton, and for livestock, animal health and forestry.
Many of these stations suffer personnel shortages
[ibid.:32-3, 36-7, 54 and Annex 10]:
Resources are considered inadequate in 25 research
establishments, and very inadequate in about 15...
there are more research stations than can be
adequately staffed . . . Sub-stations should be
managed by [technicians, and scientists con-
centrated in a few regional and national centres.] It
seems wasteful . . . to locate one or two young
research scientists at [each of many] sub-stations
where they are likely to receive little or no guidance
and where their chances of being productive arc
minimal [ibid. :54-5].
Outside Kenya, dispersion among stations is usually
even worse. In the Ivory Coast, 'la balkanisation
actuelle de la recherche agronomique en un nombre
élevé d'institutions autonomes, de nationalités,
statuts, tutelles et modes de financement' has been
very imperfectly remedied by the Ministry of Scientific
Research, created in 1971 [von der Osten et al.
1982:20]. In Malawi, apart from the three main
stations sharing 60 scientists, another eight minor
stations share 12; once again, 'the spending of meagre
resources across an inefficient network of stations
exacerbates the effects of inadequate resources'
[Gilbert el al. 1982:12-13,28].
There is a real case for improving regional
representativeness by multiplying research stations;
but it tends, in SSA, to reduce an already inadequate
'mass' at each station. An obvious idea is to create
national stations located at the borders of two or more
agroclimatic zones. Concentration of stations, how-
ever, risks even more exclusion of remote (and often
very poor) areas, and even more submersion of rural
research in urban priorities. Like many issues of
research organ isalion, the issue of 'critical mass' is
unlikely to respond to neal, general blueprints, applied
rapidly by teams of visiting experts, and claiming lo
provide general answers to major administrative
questions. Much more promisingly:
Simple, unpretentious improvements in Organi-
sation and Methods could increase critical
scientific mass via lower turnover and fewer
techno-administrative diversions.
Attention to the content of agricultural research
could help. Across a great variety of organi-
sational forms in LDCs, some sorts of crop and
animal problems seem to respond to research.
Concentration of scientists on these research
issues would also help to reduce the current
dispersion, by increasing the critical scientific
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mass applied to fewer issues [on multiplicity of
programmes in Malawi, see Gilbert et al.:vii].
Research/Output Congruence
Dispersion of scarce scientists among many, distant
stations8 is a bad way to make AR relevant to the
problems of diffused, extensive, diverse agricultutral
countries in SSA; but it recognises the relevance
problem, just as the concentration proposals recognise
the critical-mass problem. Are there better ways to
increase the relevance of AR to raising SSA's
agricultural welfare, without reducing sustained,
collaborative scientific concentration on central
issues? One approach is to achieve better 'congruence'
between output-mix and research-mix. A second is
indigenisation of AR personnel, priorities and purses.
A third is to combine socioeconomic with agricultural-
science analysis. A fourth is to switch applied AR into
'farm systems' as well as, or to some extent instead of,
individual commodities [Collinson 1982].
The simple rule of congruence, that the ratio of the
research expenditure for a commodity to its economic
value of. . . should be equal for all commodities is
based on 'the plasticity of nature' which is over the
long term reasonable [Boyce and Evenson 1975:84].
By 'plasticity' Boyce and Evenson mean that,
whatever the commodity, 'efforts to uncover the
secrets of nature' are, more or less, 'equally productive
no matter where the effort was directed'. They
recognise (a) that a country might research at levels
below those indicated by the congruence rate into
products heavily researched by 'environmental
neighbours'; and (b) that products in price-inelastic
demand might justify lower research/output ratios
than other products, because benefits would accrue to
consumers (as price cuts) rather than to producers,
who would be forced to respond to prices by relatively
'costly . . . factor adjustment' [ibid.: 118].
The congruence rule -. subject to modification (a)
above, to commonsense refusal to keep on at products
or soils clearly unresponsive for scientifically
demonstrable reasons, and to an important distri-
butional caveat - seems a useful rough guideline for
SSA. The distributional caveat is that the congruence
rule, in assuming 'plasticity of nature' (in respect of
marginal as well as average long-run expected
productivity of research across commodities), finesses
the question of whether extra product values are
correctly reflected by relative prices. Many govern-
ments' rhetoric, and some governments' practice,
would give greater weight, per unit of extra output, to
products produced or consumed - preferably both
Apart from the static arithmetic, there is a further drawback, if
critical mass depends on continuity in, as well as on numbers at, a
station. Each new station represents a new prospect of transfer.
- by very poor people. That would imply above-
congruent research/output9 ratios for these products,
and below-congruent ratios for others, notably for
estate-based export crops. tO
Research Biases: Domestic and International
Do SSA commodity compositions of AR - allowing
for distribution, for non-responsive commodities, for
'free' foreign reseach, and for the wish not to pass on
research benefits to 'price-inelastic demanders' in rich
countries - achieve a reasonable degree of relevance-
by-congruence? Table I reveals not only a bias
towards export crops and rich people's crops world-
wide, but also a tendency to concentrate research for a
crop upon places where it is not a locally-consumed or
poor person's product (compare Asian and African
data for rice and wheat, much more mass-
consumption crops in Asia, much more prestige and
high-research products in Africa). In general, Africa
reveals much greater disproportions, in respect of
emphasis upon AR into exported commodities and the
products of richer farmers and urban consumers, than
does Asia or even Latin America [Judd et al. 1983:27]
develop a measure of overall commodity congruence,
between output-mix and AR-outlay-mix, for 26
LDCs, including six in SSA. This measure shows that
the SSA countries are among the less congruent
overall: Ghana ranks 11th out of 26, Sudan 14th,
Kenya 19th, Uganda 20th, Tanzania 21st, and Nigeria
23rd. Poor people's crops - cassava, sweet potatoes,
maize - everywhere enjoy research/output ratios well
below congruence, and rich people's products,
especially animal products, ratios much above; but
these disparities, in particular, are substantially higher
in Africa than in Asia or Latin America [ibid. :24-5].
Despite the much greater reliance of most Asian
agricultures on animal draught and integrated
farming, it is in SSA that animal husbandry enjoys
higher shares of AR [Oram and Bindlish 1981:541.11
The bias in national AR towards export crops
[Pinstrup-Anderson 1982:64] and rich people's
products, and away from congruence, is especially
strong in SSA. Surely, the reasons are political, rather
than the results of 'rational' attempts by a neutral state
to maximise the yield on research revenues. But the
the Boyce-Es enson, Judd et al., and York et al. data are for gross
agricultural product in these estimates. Logically, the Boyce-
Evenson argument requires net product tobe used. In SSA (but not
elsewhere) this probably makes little difference.
'°lf such crops are very labour-intensive even on estates. one might
nevertheless make a distributional case for high research/output
ratios - unless benefits were largely transferred to (price-inelastic)
foreign demanders.
° Proportion of research scientists working on animal husbandry,
unweighted average: seven South and South East Asian LDCs, 9.3
per cent; seven in SSA, 22.3 per cent; seven in Latin America, 21.1
per cent [Orans and Bindlish 1981J.
Table I
National AR as a percentage of product value
Sweet Potatoes Field Chick
Sorghum Cassava Potatoes (White) beans2 peas
0.77 0.07 0.09 0.68 0.25 0.18
0.09 0.19 0.43 1.65
0.06 0.08 0.19 0.08
0.19 0.19 0.43 0.60
Cocoa Sugar Vegetables Beef Pork Poultry All
1971-2' ... ... ... ... 0.50
1972-9 23.59 0.23 3.12 1.57 1.06 1.13
1972-9 2.33 0.17 1.25 14.17 0.13 0.41
AI1LDCs
Africa
Asia
Latin
America 1972-9 0.68 0.23
politics are not only those of conventional state
machines, but also of research. Scientists like to work
on projects that appear interesting, internationally
respected, paradigmatic and fashionable. Research
directors structure incentives, advice, and moral
suasion to advance such projects. AR is in most
countries a foreign implantation. This not only
increases - perhaps doubles - the cost of a scientist
person-year directly, when the various housing,
settlement, tax and other allowances to overseas
experts are allowed for. Even more serious is the
indirect effect in reducing the commitment of national
scientists as they are denied national leadership roles.
Such national AR scientists are induced to join the
brain-drain out of research, often to lifelong work in
many a Western institute or firm.
The process is hard to stop, because there are so many
private gainers from the alienation and frustration of
indigenous research. Both African and Western
researchers gain cash and status. Western firms and
institutes - even sometimes UN specialised agencies
- generate demand for their own services and a case
0.88
1.82 2.56 1.99
0.65 0.39 0.32
1.57 0.48 1.13 0.67 0.60 1.12
Sources: Row 1 and fns. a: York, Miller, Dalrymple et al. 1977:5 1-2. Rows 2-4: Judd, Boyce and Evenson 1983:24-5.
Notes: '1972 for LDC output, 1971 for research outlay by national centres. Ifwe add research by CG Centres (1976 data, reduced
by 30% to allow very roughly for inflation), some figures increase, and become: rice, .30%, wheat, .70%; maize, .81%;
sorghum, .81%; cassava, .09%; sweet potatoes, .10%; white potatoes, .80%; dry beans, .32%; chick peas, .23%, cattle, .91%.
2 Dry beans in Row 1 (all LDCs).
for 'aid' support from their own governments and
universities. As for African governments and
universities, the way for a department to gain prestige
and cash is to initiate new research projects dependent
on fresh foreign skills - 'to grow a cabbage, call an
expert from the FAO' - rather than to build on, or in
many cases to rescue, old projects due for
'indigenisation' of leadership posts.
Are these words too harsh? I know that African food
production will not respond significantly to current
price-policy fashions, nor to tomorrow's fashions
either, without seed-water-fertiliser-based research
breakthroughs, tested for safety and profitability in
smallholder environments. I accept, too - given
'twenty years largely wasted' in the post-Independence
agricultures of many (not all) SSA countries - that
such breakthroughs cannot be achieved without
foreign involvement. But throwing money and foreign
experts at half-analysed research issues, to create
overlapping and (in all senses) foreign research
systems, is not the way to achieve such research
breakthroughs.
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Region/zone Date Rice Wheat Maize
1. AIILDCs 1971-2' 0.26 0.65 0.75
2. Africa 1972-9 1.05 1.30 0.44
3. Asia 1972-9 0.21 0.32 0.21
4. Latin
America 1972-9 0.41 1.04 0.18
Region/zone Date Soybeans Cotton Coffee
Let us look again at two rather successful agricultural
systems in the SSA context. In Kenya, 'out of a total of
390 research scientists engaged, less than 15 per cent
have postgraduate or research-oriented training and
qualifications that would fit them into the research
and development functions to be performed'. In 1978,
at PhD !evel, there were 15 Kenyans in AR - and 27
non-Kenyans [Taylor et al. 198 1:78, 129]. In Malawi,
of 75 researchers, 'only four (excluding expatriates)
have PhD degrees', and a further 21 'have sufficient
training and experience to make them effective
researchers if other essential resources were available'
[Gilbert et al.: x, 21, 46]. Moreover, 'promotion
opportunities . . . are insufficient to motivate
researchers to stay in research' [ibid.: x].
'Stratégies elaborées par Paris'
The problem in 'Francophone' SSA countries is much
more serious. 'Cogestion' blends most of their
research systems into dominant French institutions,
methods, and even ministerial control. A multiplicity
of cross-cutting, foreign-led research operations (plus,
usually, a parallel but lower-status domestic operation)
produces a mixture of neocolonialism and anarchy.
Let us look at expert judgements before numbers, and
again start with a relatively successful agricultural
system, that of the Ivory Coast:
L'ensemble des institutions qui pratiquent des
activités de recherche agronomique . . . constitue
un puzzle compliqué et imparfait, fruit de l'histoire
du pays et d'initiatives plus ou moins opportunes.
Un puzzle compliqué par le nombre et la nature des
institutions concernées. . . Un puzzle imparfait car
toutes ces activités de recherche agronomique ne
sont pas toujours complementaires . . . Les
[institutions] les plus importantes . . . - plus de
80% des chercheurs ivoiriens [sont des] expatriés
- ont été héritées de la colonisation et témoignent
par leur fonctionnement, leurs ressources humaines,
financières et materielles à l'omnipresence de la
coopération française .....ORSTOM et les huit
instituts GERDAT ont leur 'siège' en France et
disposent, chacun, d'un 'réseau' constitué de
centres et de laboratoires de recherche en France
(metropole et Outre-Mer) . . . Ces neufs
organisations ont eu jusqu'à présent des stratégies
autonomes de coopération et de recherche, définies
par leurs instances de direction (où sont representés
les Ministères françaises concernés) . . . Les
implantations en Côte d'ivoire. . . ont gagné, parla
volonté ivoirienne, en autonomie par rapport aux
stratégies scientifiques transnationales élaborées
par Paris [von der Osten el al. 1982:15-167.
Gain in scientific autonomy is worth having, but why
should a nation, with complex agricultural problems
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(and deteriorating performance), sacrifice anything of
its research policy to 'stratégies scientifiques trans-
nationales élaborées par Paris' (or London, Washing-
ton, Moscow, etc.)? Is not the result, in conjunction
with the need to develop national AR institutions
alongside the French-dominated ones - and the
likelihood that the national institutions will offer
lower pay and status - sure to be unsatisfactory?
Conflict, confusion, and lack of Ivoirien self-reliance
are inherent in the system of research 'cogestion',
ultimately dependent on 'stratégies . . élaborées par
Paris'. The consequences go far beyond [ibid.: 44] 'les
multiples sinon excessives sollicitations extérieures
(réunions, déplacements, visites)' - symptomatic of
and contributory to, brain-drain as these doubtless
are.
The resulting numbers, indeed, are staggering for a
country independent for almost a quarter-century,
and with one ofSSA's better living-standards, literacy
rates, and - until about 1975 - agricultural records.
In 1981, only 61 of 238 researchers 31 of 178 in the
'instituts cogérés', 30 of 34 in the relatively tiny
national system - were Ivoirien. Foreign dominance
interlocked with high emphasis on research into
export and industrial crops; of the 168 commodity-
assignable workers, these crops commanded 91, of
whom 82 per cent were foreign, as against 54 for
food-producing agriculture [68 per cent: ibid.: 18, 26].
Financially, too, this is a foreign programme: in 1981,
the Ivory Coast paid for only 38.8 per cent of 'its'
public-sector AR [ibid.: 49].
The situation is probably even worse in similarly
French-dominated AR systems in really poor - and
much less literate, yet more agriculture-dependent -
countries of SSA. Burkina Faso is an interesting
exception, in that 64 of its 123 AR scientists in 1982-83
were nationals; but this could be achieved only by
incurring a cost per scientific person-year about
double the levels prevailing in West Africa, and -
perhaps partly for that reason - by meeting 'plus de
90% de l'ensemble des dépenses, meme celles
comprenant des allocations en paiement du personnel
de la Fonction Publique . par des sources de
financement en provenance de l'etranger' [Antione et
al. 1983: 33]. To permit significant indigenisation of
research personnel - in a system where foreign
institutions at once attract brain-drain and repel those
seeking promotion to genuine leadership and control
ofnational research - a very poor country must offer
salaries implying financial alienation: Catch-22.
Many SSA governments rightly wish to avoid post-
haste indigenisation at the expense of research quality.
However, foreign-dominated research systems -
where expatriates come and go and bring prestige,
cash, and draining prospects for national brains -
have at once severe developmental limitations, and
built-in pressures: to maintain themselves; to research
for Western journals, often at the cost of local
relevance; to insert colleagues, and to export, rather
than to promote, local talent. Given the long-term
problems of most SSA educational systems, the only
feasible solution to the immediate dilemma - that
rapid indigeriisation loses quality, but that slow
indigenisation is infeasible given the above pressures
- is to develop agricultural policy and AR systems
that are less costly, in general and especially in terms of
expatriate skill and money.
Agricultural Policy, AR and Social Science
Economics and other social sciences are most needed
when the natural scientist appears most confident that
they are not. For example, it is too easy for AR
scientists to propose - and for visiting experts to
confirm - that, 'abandoned tea fields suggest that the
new smaliholders do not yet fully understand the risks
and opportunities of intensive tea cultivation' [ibid.:
36]. A micro-economist would first test whether the
intensive advice might conflict with smallholders'
preferences; a sociologist, whether the gains from
intensive cultivation are not sought by the smallholder
because they would be absorbed by, or would
strengthen, actual or potential landlords or money-
lenders; a planning or benefit/cost economist,
whether major switches to tea production (given its
effect on prices, plus likely exogenous price trends) are
desirable for Kenya.
Without an agricultural policy, research organisation
is not much use. A centralised organisation can mean
further removal of researchers from both professional
motivation and farm-level contacts, and further
diversion of time from research, especially in the year
or two while the new organisation (and its power
struggles) are settling down. There is, unfortunately,
more than a hint of faith in a centralised research
blueprint, as at least a partial substitute for
agricultural policy, about some of the recent reports
on African national systems [e.g. Taylor et al. 1981:
vii; Contant et al. 1982: 51, 67-8; Antoine et al. 1983:
i-ii, y, 43].
Given that agricultural policy is likely to remain self-
contradictory, pressure-ridden and messy, can any-
thing useful be said in general about AR? That its
content can change cost-effectively - by crop-mix, via
farm-level socioeconomics, etc. - we have illustrated.
No great global verities about its form (more
outstations for outreach, or fewer for critical mass?)
are on offer.
Government willingness to spend more on AR
depends, in part, on the perceived efficiency of such
spending. Suppose, first, that 'efficiency' means
contribution to net value added by farm output per
unit of input, irrespective of distribution of that
output, and assuming that we know the relative
product and input prices at the time when the research
comes onstream. The 'efficiency' of research can be
increased either by lowering cost or by raising benefit.
The resulting cost/benefit ratio is increased by delay
- and subjected to risk - at each of three stages:
(a) between initiation and successful output of the
research, (b) between output and adoption by the
farmer, (c) between adoption and attainment of higher
ratios of farm output values to farm input values.
Good research design choices, e.g. of regions or crops
(or crop-mixes, or livestock-crop combinations) for
special emphasis, therefore do not depend only on the
research director's best-estimate probability of a
successful outcome, even as modified by an
economist's best estimate of the rate and extent of
adoption and diffusion, and the scientist's of the yield
response to various levels and circumstances of
adoption. They depend also on the delay at each stage
- and on the degrees of confidence attached to each of
those three estimates, from which we can calculate the
probability-distributions of given increases in farm
output in five, seven, ten . . . years as a result of
initiating the research.
In general, there is a trade-off between accepting
different sorts of cost, delay, or uncertainty: in respect
of achieving research success; of achieving X per cent
diffusion given success; of achieving the expected-
value Y per cent rise in yields given diffusion. Also
there is a trade-off between quick results and certain
results; and between speed and certainty, on the one
hand, and cheapness on the other. These trade-offs
carry research design implications: should one
concentrate research on raising output in safer areas,
on raising output of safer crops in risky areas, or on
reducing risk to a given crop and area?
Distributional Considerations
So far, this discussion has largely omitted distributional
considerations, for three reasons. First, intra-rural
distribution in most of SSA is far less unequal than in
South Asia. Second poor people's main hope in SSA is
to reduce the grotesque rural-urban gaps. Third the
overriding need for poor people is to get per-person
food availability rising somehow in a set of
environments where it has been falling. In SSA, unlike
South Asia, most poor people are directly farming for
food, so that, unless stupid tractorisation policies are
adopted, higher availability will accompany higher
power to purchase food.
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However, these points are not quite sufficient. HYVs'
'second-generation problems' arrive very fast, even in
SSA, especially alongside growing labour gluts. For
example, we are told that the Chilalo Agricultural
Development Unit (CADU) in Ethiopia 'rapidly
expanded use of improved varieties of wheat and teff
and of fertiliser by farmers participating in the project,
with an approximate doubling of wheat yields'
[Anthony et al. 1979: 256]. Indeed so; but it also
encouraged the dispossession of tenants by large
landlords, who then displaced labour with combine
harvesters. The view that - in Kenya, for instance
- subsistence-commercial 'dualism is gradually being
transformed with the division of large farms in the
high-potential areas into smaller commercial farms
and the formation of a continuum from subsistence
farming to highly commercialised large-scale farming'
[Taylor et al. 1981: 4] is much too sanguine. Political
and economic factors, alongside rising person/land
ratios, can induce polarisation; and, even if there is a
transition from bimodal to unimodal agricultures as
Taylor and his colleagues predict, the result need not
be less unequal, or better for the poor, if the variability
of farm size (or net income) around the mean is very
high in the unimodal situation.
It is notable that although the current Kenyan Plan's
'basic strategy for development. . . is the alleviation of
poverty, throughout the nation', poverty-orientation
played no part in the terms of reference for the report
on its AR commissioned by the Government from
ISNAR [Taylor et al. 1981: 1, 10; their italics]. Indeed,
'There was no convincing evidence that major
emphasis is being placed on the development of
production technologies for the small farmer' [ibid.: i,
xii]. As we have illustrated, the relative weakness of
food-crop research, especially for cheap calorie
sources consumed locally, further militates against
equal distribution, even relative to initial income, of
AR benefits.
Probably, almost all the sorts of change that would be
introduced into AR in SSA for reasons of dynamic
efficiency - a shift to labour-intensity, to under-
researched root crops and subsistence cereals, to risk-
reduction via controlled water supply - would tend to
improve income distribution as well. The goal of
reducing poverty, therefore, strengthens arguments
for AR reform that are strong already.
One possible exception concerns the regional balance
of research. A research-station strategy to maximise
expected net agricultural value added from given
research inputs might mean further neglect of remote
regions, and hence of many of the poor. If research
stations need to avoid risk by going for some fairly safe
'winners' among their AR projects, then the initial
researcher ignorance (and water risk) besetting many
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remote areas might, once again, direct AR away from
seeking to benefit poor people there. But the main
threat to effective research for 'backward regions' is
that they get opened up (by heavily-subsidised or 'free'
transport and other grid-based infrastructures) to
product competition - and emigration - before they
have developed potential surpluses for specialisation
and exchange.
National agricultural research in sub-Saharan Africa
is, in general, not cost-effective. It concentrates
heavily on a few export crops in price-inelastic
demand, where, if it succeeds, the gains go largely to
Western consumers. Poor people's crops - especially
roots and cheap cereals, where on-farm or local
consumption (plus hunger) mean that there is little or
no problem about inelastic demand - are generally
neglected. Unrewarding career structures mean rapid
turnover, and this plus the large number of stations
means generally below-critical scientific masses. Yet,
for all the special problems of SSA's numerous micro-
climates, a large accumulated reserve of internationally
researched, largely seed-fertiliser-based, innovations
is ready for national AR to undertake screening,
testing, and adaptation to local smallholders'
economic circumstances.
However, this will require policy change transcending
AR. Reform of AR can help, though a centralised
blueprint is not a panacea. However, a context in
which SSA governments drastically raise the share of
domestic cash and skill resources, current and capital,
for the agricultural sector - including controlled
water supply, especially micro-irrigation - is needed
for major improvements from AR. These will do best,
not 'only' for distribution but also on plain efficiency
grounds, if they increasingly stress labour-intensity,
smallholding, and roots and cheap cereals.
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